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1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the demand for education under various insti- 
tutional arrangements. Education has a number of properties which make the 
analysis of the demand for it both interesting and complex. 
First, education is provided in the United States both publicly and privately; 
although there are a few other publicly provided goods which are also privately 
supplied (e.g., police protection), education is perhaps the most important public 
good in which both public and private provision plays an important role. 
Secondly, primary responsibility for education in the United States has 
traditionally been placed on local governmental bodies, and hence the analysis 
of the demand and supply of education involves an analysis of local public goods 
and the relations between local and other governmental bodies. 
Thirdly, education is itself a complex commodity. It is a consumption good 
and a capital good, i.e., although much of the expenditure is justified in terms of 
the effects on the individual’s income in the future, many of the activities of 
educational institutions are primarily justifiable in terms of their immediate 
consumption benefits. Moreover, education affects individuals’ future incomes 
both by providing skills and by providing inforniation about individuals’ 
characteristics (the human capital versus the screening views of education). It is 
both a public good and a private good; that is, most of the benefits of education 
accrue directly to those who are being educated, although public education has 
been defended on the social return to having an educated citizenry. (Presumably; 
this refers to social returns which are not captured by the individual himself. I 
am a little skeptical about the importance of the social returns which are in 
excess of the private returns.) Finally, public education has traditionally been 
defended for its redistributive effects, i.e., for providing a good (which may in 
fact be a private good) to children independently of the wealth of the parents of 
the children, yet more recently it has been attacked as major contributor to 
inequality. 
*Paper presented to the September 1973 Siena meeting of the International Seminar on 
Public Economics. The author is indebted to A.B. Atkinson for helpful comments. Research 
support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
D 
350 J. E. Stiglitz, Demand for education 
What I propose to do here, rather than to treat education in all of its com- 
plexity, is to consider the demand for education in each of its separate roles. 
The basic burden of this paper is to suggest that the equilibrium level of 
expenditure on education is likely to differ markedly depending on the institu- 
tional arrangement for its provision - public, mixed private-public, or purely 
private - but in none of these cases is the level of expenditure necessarily Pareto 
Optimal. In some cases, there is a clear presumption that public provision leads 
to an under-supply, while in other cases, there is some presumption that there 
will be an oversupply. 
Sections 2-4 treat education in its conventional aspects as a consumption 
good and as providing ‘human capital’, while section 5 investigates the role of 
education in providing information about individuals’ characteristics. Regret- 
ably, the analysis quickly becomes very complex. Thus the analysis is developed 
in detail only for some special cases, but it is hoped that the insights gained are 
of more general applicability. 
2. Pure public goods and pure publicly provided private goods 
A pure public good is conventionally defined as a good which has two 
characteristics: (a) the marginal cost of an additional person consuming it is 
zero; (b) the cost of excluding an individual from its benefits is infinite (pro- 
hibitive). 
A pure publicly provided private good is a private good (a good for which 
there is a substantial marginal cost of an additional person consuming it) which 
is provided in equal quantities to all individuals (within a given class) without 
charge. There may be several reasons for providing such goods publicly; there 
may be high costs of exclusion (high costs of charging for the particular services 
performed) or there may be ethical (distributional) grounds for providing it 
publicly. (All individuals ‘ought’ to receive equal medical treatment indepen- 
dently of their ability to pay; the education of children ‘ought not’ to depend on 
the wealth of their parents.) 
In most developed economies, education is publicly provided; and there seems 
little question that the marginal cost of educatin, w an additional individual is 
substantial (probably close to the average cost, at least for large school systems). 
Yet there remains some dispute about whether it is best thought of as a pure 
public good or as a pure publicly provided private good. The dispute can be 
thought of in the following way. Let %lI be the individual’s utility function, and 
among its potential arguments are the levels of education, Ei, of each individual 
in society, including himself, 
~’ = -ly-‘(E,, E,,... Ej,...E”,...). 
(9 
Clearly, if education were a pure private good, then we could write 
-W’ = ~‘(Ej,...), (1’) 
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not depending on Ei, i # j. On the other hand, if the sole benefit of education 
were an educated citizenry, which affected the ‘quality of government’ then we 
could write the utility function in the following form,’ 
W-j = W’($(E,, . . . . E,), . ..). all j. (1”) 
A special case of (1”) is the conventional formulation for a pure public good, 
9-j = w-j (iglE,,...). 
There are obviously ‘mixed’ cases where the ith individual’s consumption of 
education enters the jth individual’s welfare but not ‘symmetrically’, and educa- 
tion is clearly one of those ‘mixed cases’. Such a case we might depict by2 
Yfj = Wi(Ej, $(E, , . . ., E,), . . .). 
Analytically, we need to make two distinctions: 
( 1”‘) 
(a) Even if at low levels of El, . . . E,, there may be public goods aspects of 
education, these may reach saturation at levels of expenditure on education 
below those which would be privately demanded. That is, if Ef is the equilibrium 
level of consumption of education by the ith individual in a purely private school 
system, then 
W:(EP, 4(E:, . . . , E,p), . ..) = 0, all j. (2) 
In such a case, although there are public goods aspects of education, for resource 
allocation purposes, these public goods aspects may be ignored. Those who say 
that education is ‘basically’ a private good are, I think, saying that it is not 
unrealistic to assume that condition (2) holds. 
(b) Although pure publicly provided private goods and pure public goods 
represent very diflerent kinds of commodities, the conditions for Pareto Optimality 
(appropriately interpreted) are identical: the sum of the marginal rate of sub- 
stitution must equal the marginal rate of transformation, where the marginal cost 
of providing one elitra unit of the ‘pure publicly pro&ded private good’ is inter- 
preted to mean providing one extra unit of the good to everyone. 
To see this, assume for simplicity that there is a single privately provided 
private good, P, so the jth individual’s welfare may be written as 
Wj = W-‘(Ej, Pi), (3) 
IIt should be noted that in this representation, we are in effect considering education as an 
intermediate good. 
2There are obviously other representations of mixed cases. In some sense, any representation 
of the form YF’-J(E, ,. . . , En, . ..). in which WrJ # 0 and which cannot be written in the form 
(l”), can be considered to be a ‘mixed’ case. 
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and that there is a production possibilities schedule for the economy of the form 
T(x Ej, cPj) = 0. (4) 
We assume there are N individuals, so for a pure publicly provided private good, 
cj Ej = NE. Then Pareto Optimality requires maximization of, say W’, given 
W2,..., W”, subject to the constraint (4). Forming the Lagrangian 
9 = CA’w’(E, Pj) + pT(NE, 1 Pj) > 
we obtain first-order conditions, 




the required result. 
In the next section, we analyze the relationship between the equilibrium supply 
of education and the Pareto Optimal level. It makes no difference for our 
analysis whether education is considered to be a pure public good or a pure 
publicly provided private good, so long as all individuals go to public schools. 
What does make a difference is that under certain circumstances, if education is a 
private good, it may pay for some individuals to purchase (in addition to or in 
place of public education) some private education. This seriously complicates the 
analysis of the demand for education, and is considered separately in the sub- 
sequent section. 
3. Comparison between majority voting equilibrium and Pareto Optimality 
The object of this section is to consider the relationship between the allocation 
to public goods (whether pure public goods or publicly provided private goods) 
which emerges in a majority voting democracy with the Pareto Optimal alloca- 
tion. The results reported in section 3.1 apply to any public good; these results 
are applied to education in section 3.2. 
The question of whether there is a systematic bias in providing too little or too 
much public goods is a subject which has been extensively debated by political 
economists and journalists : one hears simultaneously complaints about the 
starvation of public services amidst private affluence and complaints about 
excessively high tax rates and excessive government expansion. The explanation 
of w.hy there is too ‘much’ or too little public expenditure is often associated with 
judgments concerning the nature of the political process. Those who see there 
being too little expenditure often argue that the political process under-represents 
the poor; those who see there being too much expenditure argue that, in 
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democratic systems, since the poor have an equal vote with the rich, but bear a 
relatively small proportion of the costs of government expenditure, there is a 
natural tendency for democratic systems to have excessive expenditures. Neither 
side usually makes clear the welfare norm against which such statements are 
being made. 
In the discussion below, we will not directly address ourselves to the political 
judgments implicit in much of this debate. Rather, we shall simply examine the 
outcome of a majority voting process. Intuitively, neither side in the above 
argument is convincing: if the good that is being provided is a public good, the 
fact that the poor do not contribute to the cost of its provision yet benefit from 
it does not subtract from the benefits which accrue to the rich. The vested 
interests of the rich in the provision of some public goods, like police protection 
and perhaps education, would seem to be at least as great as that of the poor. 
On the other hand, although the poor do contribute less to the provision of the 
public good, their marginal utility of private goods is also higher than that of 
the rich, and so long as they contribute something, the poor may actually be 
relatively ‘low demanders’. The answer provided in the analysis of section 
3.1 is, not surprisingly, that ‘it depends’; under our simplifying assumptions, 
however, we are able to show that it depends on just two parameters. 
There is a second, quite different, strand of literature which has been con- 
cerned with the allocation of resources to public goods. This has been concerned 
with the problems of getting individuals to reveal their true preferences. On the 
one hand, if the amount a particular individual has to pay depends on this 
revealed demand for thi public good, there will be a tendency to under-represent 
one’s true preferences; on the other hand, some of the recent literature on the 
revelation of demands has been based on the hypothesis of lump sum taxation, 
so that the level of demand of the public good revealed by the individual does not 
directly affect the taxes the individual pays. It has been argued that in this case, 
individuals will reveal their true preferences. 
In most economies, however, there is a close link between the level of expendi- 
ture and the level of taxation which an individual has to pay, but not a direct 
link between a particular individual’s revealed demand and the amount he has 
to pay. This means’ that the demands ex’pressed by individuals in the political 
process depend on the particular tax system employed; but it also means that 
rhe demands expressed will not be the demands they would have expressed were 
there lump sum taxation, but neither are they the ‘zero demands’ they would have 
expressed if their taxes depended on the particular level of demand for public 
gocds which they expressed. 
Again, it is not obvious without a closer examination whether, given simple 
tax structures, the equilibrium level of public expenditure will be too small or 
too large (greater or less than the Pareto Optimal level). 
For local public goods, taxes are simply proportional to expenditure, and this 
is the hypothesis which we shall adopt throughout this paper. 
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3.1. The zenera case 
The model we present in this section is consistent with education being either 
a consumption or an investment good, a pure public good or a pure publicly 
provided private good. 
We let G be the level of expenditure on the public good. We assume that the 
set of voters and of taxpayers are identical. Wealth (assumed to be given exo- 
genously) of the ith individual is denoted by Wi. Thus total national wealth is 
just 
1 Wi = IF’N, (6) 
where N is the number of voters in the economy, and IV is mean wealth. Thus if 
public expenditures are financed by proportional income taxes, and if z is the 
tax rate, then 
G = rrN. (7) 
The ith individual votes for the level of public expenditure which maximizes his 
utility. We represent utility as a function of the expenditure on the public good 
(G) and on the private good, P. P is just his after tax wealth, 
Pi = (I-Z)Wi. (8) 
Thus he maximizes 
(9) is maximized when 
(10) 
i.e., when the individual’s marginal rate of substitution between public and 
private goods is equal to the ratio of his wealth to total wealth. In particular, if 
YV is quasi-concave, then preferences are single-peaked, and the majority voting 
equilibrium will be the level of demand of the individual with median wealth, 
which we denote by &‘, provided that the demand for G is monotonic in Wi. 
If we assume that individuals differ only’ with respect to their endowment, but 
not with respect to their utility function, then we can trace out, as in fig. 1, the 
demand for the public good as a function of Wi. The curve so generated is 
analogous to a price-consumption curve, as it should be: essentially, individuals 
who are wealthier face a higher ‘tax price’. As the diagram illustrates, there are 
two effects which work in opposite directions. Wealthier individuals are on a 
higher indifference curve, which leads them to demand mere G (the *income 
effect’) but face a higher tax price which leads them to demand less G (the 
‘substitution effect’). Either effect may dominate. 
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Alternatively, the level of G voted for may not even be monotonic in W. Since 
preferences are single peaked, there is still a majority voting equilibrium. Now, 
however, the ‘median voter’ is not the individual with median income. In fig. lc, 
G 
Fig. 1 
the very poor and the very rich are ‘low demanders’ ; the middle classes are high 
demanders. The majority voting equilibrium will correspond to the most pre- 
ferred point of individuals at two different levels of income, one above median, 
the other below median. 
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First consider the case where the demand for public goods is monotonic in W 
(either fig. la or lb). Then the majority voting equilibrium is given by 
NW,(G, (1 -+&‘I) l& 
Tz(G, (I-r)@ = w’ 
(11) 
while Pareto Optimality requires 
c, 
“Wr(G, (l-r)WJ l 
%‘-,(G, (1 -r) Wi) = ’ 
(12) 
Dividing (12) by (ll), we immediately obtain the result that the majority voting 
equilibrium will entail a too small or a too large supply of public goods as the ratio 
of the mean marginal rate of substitution to that of the median exceeds or is ex- 
ceeded by the ratio of mean wealth to median wealth. 
Letting 
Wl(G, (I- &)Wi)iWz(Gs (I- &)Wi) = MRS(Wi; G) 
(13) 
(the marginal rate of substitution), we obtain 
G” 2 G” as 
C MRS(Wi, G”)/N 2 C WiIN 
MRS(ti, Go) I@ ’ 
(14) 
where G” is the Pareto Optimal level of expenditure and G” is the majority voting 
equilibrium. This may be alternatively written as 
Go >< G” as 
C MRS/N MRS(@, G”) 
WP @. 
The optimal level of expenditure exceeds the majority voting equilibrium if the 
ratio of the mean marginal rate of substitution to mean wealth exceeds the ratio 
of median marginal rate of substitution to median wealth. It is clear from fig. 1 
that the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution to wealth may be an increasing 
or decreasing function of wealth. It is also clear that which inequality obtains in 
(14) depends both on the probability distribution of individuals (by wealth) 
and on the shape of the indifference curves. Either inequality is possible. 
Thus, to obtain some feeling for whether there is likely to be an undersupply 
or an oversupply of public goods, we have to impose still more structure on our 
problem. We consider two alternative restrictions on individual’s preferences. 
(a) Homotheticity. Assume individuals have a homothetic indifference map. 
Note that if the elasticity of substitution between public and private goods is very 
small (P and G are strong complements) then the demand for G rises with 
wealth, but if it is very large (P and G are strong substitutes) then it decreases. If 
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the elasticity of substitution is constant at unity then the level of demand is 
independent of wealth: there is unanimity about the most preferred level of G, 
and hence the majority voting equilibrium and the Pareto Optimal level coincide. 
More generally, 
d In MRS dlnMRS 1 
d In P/G = dln W(l-r)/G C a’ (1% 
where 0 is the elasticity of substitution. Hence, assuming Q is constant, 






W \;v w W 
Fig.2.(a)o>lorq-cl;(b)cT<lorr,->l. 
The marginal rate of substitution is an increasing function of W. Whether it is 
convex or concave depends on whether u is less than or greater than unity, 
d2MRS > o --. 
dW2 < 
as 05 1. (17) 
Similarly, MRS/ W is an increasing or decreasing function of Was a is less than 
or greater than unity. 
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Since the mean of a 
at its mean, we obtain 
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convex function is greater than the value of the function 
MRS(@, G) as 05 1, (18) 
while from (17) we obtain the result that 
MRS( p,G) 
^ 
PV - > 
(W- W)(cV 1) 5 0. (19) 
Using (18) and (19), together with (14) we obtain the result that if @’ > F&‘, 
G” 2 G” if CJ >< 1. (20) 
If the median income is less than the mean (as it is with the kinds of skewed 
income distributions usually observed), then the majority voting equilibrium will 
entail an ‘under’ or ‘over supply of public goods as the elasticity of substitution 
between thepublic good andprivate goods is less or greater than unity. (Other cases 
depend on the detailed nature of the probability distribution.) But notice that 
in both cases, in some sense it is the preferences of the poor which dominate over 
the Pareto Optimal allocation; for when c < 1, the poor are the ‘low demanders’, 
and when o > 1, the poor are the ‘high demanders’. 
(b) Additive utility functions. The second case where we can obtain simple 
results is when the utility function is additive, i.e., we can write 
W = V(G)+ U(P). (21) 
Then the marginal rate of substitution is just 
MRS = V’(G)/U’(W(l-7)). 
More specifically, we will assume that U takes on the special form 
U’ = p-v, 
i.e., there is a constant elasticity of marginal utility, 
-u”P 
r = CT- , . 
The marginal rate of substitution is an increasing concave or convex function of 
Wi as ye is less than or greater than unity. Accordingly, 
c v/u ~ V’ -- 
N U’((1 -t)W) as 
17 p 1. 
Moreover, 
V’ V’ ~- 
LT’Wi > u’((l-7)Ep 
(Wi-~ 20 as rl 2 1. (22) 
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It immediately follows that IY the median is less than the mean, then there will be 
too little expenditure on education ~j’q > 1 and too much expenditure ifq < 1 .3 
Again, demand for public goods is an increasing or decreasing function of 
income as 4 2 1, i.e., it is the preferences of the poor which dominate. 
Notice that this result depends only on the elasticity of marginal utility of the 
private good, not at all on the characteristics of the utility function for the public 
good. Conventional estimates of the rate at which the marginal utility of private 
goods diminish suggest a value of v in the order of one to two.4 This is consistent 
with wealthier individuals demanding slightly higher levels of public goods than 
poorer individuals. If this is correct, then there may be a slight tendency for an 
undersupply of public goods. 
Effect of redistribution on the demandfor public goods 
What happens, if we have a once and for all redistribution of wealth, to the 
demand for public goods clearly depends on the effect that this redistribution has 
on the median individual. Many changes in the distribution of income might 
leave the median individual unaffected, and hence leave demand unaffected. 
Assume, however, that wealth is distributed lognormally. Then a reduction in 
the variance, keeping the mean constant, increases the median income. Whether 
this increases or decreases the demand for public goods depends on whether the 
increase in his marginal rate of substitution is proportionately greater or smaller 
than the increase in his wealth, i.e., if indifference curves are homothetic, an 
increase in equality leads to an increase or decrease in the equilibrium level of 
public goods as c 5 1; if utility functions are additive, as q 3 1. 
3.2. Application to the demand for education 
So long as we consider education to be either a private consumption or a 
public consumption good, there is little to differentiate the analysis of the 
demand for ‘education’ from that of other publicly provided goods; we might 
be able to obtain more precise estimates of the elasticity of substitution between 
3For lognormal distributions, we can obtain a quantitative stimate of the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between the majority voting solution and the ‘Lindahl’ solution. We are simply 
comparing the r]th moment of Wdivided by the mean with @“J- r. 
But, 
and 
EW” = exp (BP+-+v*s~), EW = exp @+i_?) 
P= expfi, 
where 01, s*) are the two parameters of the lognormal. Thus 
‘+i - fP_’ = f@-‘[exp(fs2(q2-I))-11 2 0 as 11 2 1. 
%ee, for instance, Stern (1973). 
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other ‘private goods’ and education, and thus be able to obtain a more precise 
estimate of the magnitude of the discrepancy between the Pareto Optimal 
allocation and the majority voting equilibrium, but there is little else we can say 
on a priori grounds. 
On the other hand, if education is primarily considered as a private capital 
good, we can obtain some further results. 
The recent literature on the economics of education has largely been con- 
cerned with exactly this aspect of education. If capital markets ,were perfect, 
there would, of course, be no motivation for the public provision of education. 
In the absence of perfect capital markets, the poor may not be able to invest 
in themselves up to the point where the marginal return is equal to the rate of 
interest, and hence efficiency as well as equity considerations are brought to bear 
in explaining the role of the public sector in providing education. 
Assume that the individual’s income Y, is a function of his education, E, and 
his ability, 8, 
Yi = M(Eiy 9J, Ml > 0, Mz > 0, Ml, < 0, Ml, > 0. (23) 
Individuals have a certain amount of wealth, 5 Wi, which they can either invest 
in education or in a physical capital good yielding return r. 
In effect, in this subsection we are considering a special case of the utility 
function (21), where 
and 
j’(G) = ME, 0)) 
U(P) = 0. 
In the case of education publicly financed by proportional taxes 
U(P) = rWi(l -?). 
Thus, we are able to apply the analysis of subsection 3.1 directly to this problem. 
We consider four cases : 
(a) Prirnte education. The individual chooses E to 
max r[ Wi - E] + M(E, 0) (24) 
subject to E 5 Wi (25) 
(assuming the individual cannot borrow against future earnings). Thus, we obtain 
M,(Ei, Q) = r, for Ei 5 Wi, (26) 
Ei = Wi, otherwise. 
5Iti this analysis, we ignore the diflerence between children and their parents. In effect, we 
are talking about the family unit. There is obviously an important clement of intergenerational 
distribution involved in education. Moreover, the fact that t!le voters are parents whik the 
dirrct beneficiaries of education are children is important, although ~1’. hat implication it has for 
our analysis is not clear. 
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Obviously, so long as the constraint (25) is binding for some individuals, the 
economy is not productively efficient. 
(b) Public education: identical abilities, dijkent wealth. Assuming all in- 
dividuals are identical is equivalent to assuming ei the same for all i. The 
majority voting equilibrium will be at the point where 
M1(Em, 0) = r@W. (27) 
Obviously, Pareto Optimality (which in this case is equivalent to maximizing net 
national income) require 
M1(Eo, 0) = r. (28) 
Hence 
E” >( E” as IQ w. (29) 
The level of education is greater or smaller than the level which maximizes net 
national income as the median wealth is less or greater than the mean. For skewed 
distributions such as the lognormal, there is ‘too much’ investment in public 
education from the efficiency point of view. 
(c) Public education: di$erent abilities, identical wealth. If individuals differ 
with respect to the efficiency with which they learn, then obviously it is optimal 
to have different levels of E for different individuals. There has, of course, been 
extensive discussion of how much E should differ, how homogeneously in- 
dividuals should be grouped, etc. On the one hand, differences in ability to learn 
should be associated with some differences in E; not everyone would benefit 
from a college education. On the other hand, we clearly do not design a separate 
educational program for each individual, i.e., there is always some grouping of 
individuals of different abilities. 
We shall examine the polar case where all individuals receive the same level of 
E. This is the case of what we have called the ‘pure publicly provided private 
good’. 
For simplicity, we assume that all individuals have the same shape education 
production function, but that the more able function differs multiplicatively from 
the less able; that is, we have 
Y = Bp(E), m’ > 0, mu.< 0. (237 
Then Pareto Optimality requires 
&z’(E) = r, (30) 
where 0 is the mean value of 0.6 
61f we had individualized education, we would have 
e,d(q) = r. (31) 
Since no” < 0, this would mean that individuals with more ability would receive more education. 
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On the other hand, the majority voting equilibrium entails 
&n’(Em) = r, 
where 8 is the ability of the median individual. Thus 
E” 2 E” as P p 8. 
The majority voting equilibrium will entail too much or too little expenditure 
on education as median ability (as measured by earning power at any given level 
of education) is greater or less than mean ability. Since the natural metric for 0 
is earning capacity, and this is distributed roughly lognormally, there is some 
presumption that there would be underinvestment in education, in these circum- 
stances. 
(d) PwYic edrxation : abilitirs and wealth drxerirzg. In the preceding two para- 
graphs, we have isolated two effects which work in opposite directions: the 
inequaiity of wealth leading to excessive investment in education, the inequality 
in ability being associated with too little investment in education. 
This model seems to capture the two effects one often observes in the politics 
of American education. In spite of the apparently large redistributive effect of 
public education, the wealthier professionals often seem to be among those who 
are the most ardent supporters of its expansion; this is perhaps because the 
belief in a high private return to education leads them to be relatively high 
demanders, more than compensating for the redistributive effect. 
Notice that when individuals differ only in their initial wealth, increases in 
educational expenditure beyond the level which maximizes net national income 
reduce the degree of inequality of income, while when individuals differ only in 
ability, increases in educational expenditure beyond E” increases the degree of 
inequa!ity. Thus, in both cases, even though in our formulation attitudes towards 
inequality have not entered directly into individuals voting behaviour, the 
majority voting solution is more equalitarian than the distribution of income 
(without other transfers) associated with the national income maximising level 
of education. 
When individuals differ both with respect to abilities and wealth, whether the 
majority voting equilibrium level of education is greater or smaller than the 
national income maximizing level depends on the correlation between the two. 
In one special case, where abilities and initial wealth are perfectly correlated, i.e., 
Wi = yoi, 
we obtain ^ 
id(E r$ = 0, 
or 
i.e., the level of education is optimal, independent of the distribution of ability. 
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4. Mixed public-private school systems 
There is one important distinction between pure public goods and publicly pro- 
vided private goods : in a large population, there will be little incentive for ‘high 
demanders’ of pure public goods to purchase privately additional amounts beyond 
that supplied publicly; while it is commonly the case that high demanders of 
publicly provided private goods purchase some amounts of the good (or close 
substitutes to it) privately. Such is particularly the case with education; while all 
individuals can obtain free education at public expense, a significant proportion 
of the population send their children to private schools. This is partly because 
the ‘commodity’ they wish to purchase is somewhat different from that provided 
publicly: many parents feel strongly that their children should receive a religious 
education in colijunction with their secular education. But it is also partly 
because some parents want a high quality education (a larger expenditure on 
education) than that provided publicly. In the following discussion, we shall 
assume it is only the difference in expenditure in education which is important. 
To see the implications of the possibility of private purchase of education for 
the equilibrium level provided pub!icly, we continue our analysis of the model 
presented in section 3.2. We shall assume all individuals have the same wealth but 
differ in ability. (There we implicitly assumed that abilities did not differ very 
much, so that not even high demanders went to private schools.) 
An individual is indifferent between goin g to public school and going to 
private school when 
g(B) E max h(E) -E = Om(E”). 
IQ 
(32) 
em-E is the net income the individual obtains by going to the private school 
designed for his abilities; th(E”) is his total income from going to public 
school. 
Diagrammatically, let EF be the point on the individual production function 
where income is maximized, i.e., where 
0 @(ET) = r . (33) 
The line tangent to the education production function at ET intersects the 
vertical axis at A. OA then is the measure of ability rents (Oin?(Ei’) - ET). Clearly, 
corresponding to any value of E provided publicly, there is a critical value of 0, 
denoted by 8, such that for larger 0, ability rents exceed 8m(Em) and the in- 
dividual goes to private school. &Em) is given by the solution to (32). 
If F(e) is the distribution function of 0, then the percentage of individuals in 
public schools is F(&E)). The tax required to support an educational level E is 
thus 
zp = EF(@)). (34) 
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Accordingly, after tax income of the ith individual may be written 
r+max {&H(E”), g(O)), 
so (see fig. 4) 
dY 
- = I$ [F+EF’$], 
dE E < m- ‘(g(W), 






At low levels of E, high ability individuals go to private school; thus the only 
effect on income of an increase in expenditure is the increase in tax revenues. 
Thus; as the level of education increases, their net income is reduced. There 
exists a critical value of E (for each value of O), beyond which the individual goes 
to public school. Further increments in E increase gross income. They obviously 
also increase taxes; how much they increase taxes depends on the number of 
individuals going to private schools. Each increment in E leads to more in- 
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dividuals going to public school, and thus to a more than proportionate increase 
in taxes. Differentiating (36) once again, 
d2Y 
dE2 
= 7 [2F’O’+E(F”P+F’0”)], if E < m- ‘(g(B)/@, 
= -7 [2F’0’-tE(F”O”“+F”B”)]+~r”f4 
if E > m- ‘(g(B)/@, 
we see that, if F” < 0 (the density function in the relevant region is decreasing 
with increases in income), there may be several local maxima. In any case, there 
are always at least two peaks to income (and hence, in this model, to pre- 
ferences) : at E = 0, and at some higher level of E. 
The absence of single-peaked preferences means that there may not be a 
majority voting equilibrium. There will, however, exist perhaps several ‘local 
majority voting equilibria’; that is, if votes are taken only between a given level 
of E, and nearby levels of E, and if individuals do not pursue a ‘strategic policy’ 
(i.e., each time they vote as if they believed the outcome of that vote would 
determine the actual level of expenditure), there exists levels of E which are 
preferred by a majority to slight increases and slight decreases in E. 
Thus, there are at least two local equilibria: one entailing a completely private 
school system, the other entailing a mixed public-private school system. There may, 
in fact, be several mixed public-private equilibria, some involving high levels of 
expenditure and some involving low levels of expenditure. This model seems to 
capture one important aspect of mixed public-private education systems : it has 
been observed that some communities have high quality schools and a high 
level of support for education; others, similarly situated, have low quality 
schools and a low level of support for public education. This model suggests that 
both of these may be local equilibria.’ 
Consider the ‘upper’ equilibrium. How does this equilibrium compare with 
what would have emerged if individuals were not allowed to go to private school? 
There are three effects : 
(i) Individuals who would have been high demanders become low demanders, 
when they can purchase education privately. This lowers the ‘median’ demander, 
and hence has a tendency to lower the equilibrium level of education. 
(ii) Because only a fraction of individuals go to public school, but the revenue 
is raised from general taxation, the average cost to those sending their children 
to school per unit of education is lower; this has a tendency to raise the demand 
for education among the voters who send their children to school. 
‘There may be other explanations of this phenomena as well, related to the ‘local public 
goods’ aspects ofeducation. See, for instance, Stiglitz (1974). 
E 
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(iii) Because increments in education induce more individuals to go to public 
school, the marginal cost exceeds the average cost. This has a tendency to 
reduce the demand for education. 
It is not possible to say, without a detailed knowledge of the functions involved, 
whether the equilibrium level of education will be larger or smaller. It is even 
difficult to say something about the effect of certain changes, say, in the distribu- 
tion of ability. Assume we increase the spread of ability; this will entail a larger 
fraction of individuals going to private schools (at any level of education in the 
public schools). If the density function at 8 is also lowered in the relevant region, 
this is going to increase the demand for education at each ability level, by an 
amount depending on the tax-price elasticity of the demand for education 
(essentially, on m”). If m” is small, there will be very large changes in E demanded, 
if m” is large, there will be small changes. The median voter is now, however, a 
lower demander (a lower 0); and the magnitude of the difference between his 
demand and that of the previous ‘median’ is inversely related to m”. 
5. Education as a screening device8 
The first part of this paper stressed the ‘traditional’ roles of education, as a 
public good, as a private consumption good, as a private investment good. In 
this section, we consider education as a screening device, as a method of providing 
information about abilities of students, and the effect that this role that education 
performs has on its demand under various institutional arrangements. 
There are two methods by which education ‘screens’; that is, provides infor- 
mation about which individuals are the ‘more able’ and which are the ‘1:s~ able’.9 
First, it provides reports on the individual’s ‘performance’, particularly on 
examinations. Secondly, the choices an individual makes may reveal consider- 
able information about the individual. Individuals who choose to go on to 
university probably differ on average from those who do not, even if, up to that 
point, their performance in school has been roughly comparable. The individuals 
who decide to go to the university may be more highly motivated, they may know 
that they really do have the ability to graduate, and their performance in 
secondary school has not really reflected their ability, etc. The individual who 
chooses to go to a technical school, rather than undertake an academic course, 
clearly has revealed something about himself. This process, of providing infor- 
mation through the choices one makes, we refer to a self-selection. Clearly, for 
self-selection mechanisms to work very effectively, the individual must have 
some information about his abilities. 
*The questions dealt with in this section are discussed at greater length in Stiglitz (1972), and 
are closely related to the questions discussed in Stiglitz (forthcoming). See also Arrow (1973) 
and Spence (1973). 
9For a more extended discussion of ‘screening’, see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) and 
Stiglitz:(forthcoming). 
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For simplicity, for most of the analysis, we shall assume that the individual 
has perfect knowledge of his abilities. The individual of high ability obtains a 
return from having these abilities certified; i.e., in the absence of information, 
the individual is grouped with other individuals who are less able, and his wage 
is therefore lower than it would be if his higher ability could be certified. 
In a sense, education enables the more able to capture their ‘ability rents’ and 
this clearly affects their demands for education. But what makes the analysis of 
education systems as screening devices particularly interesting is that if the less 
able observe that ‘grade completed’ is being used as a method of obtaining 
information about ability, or that individuals are being categorized by the kind 
of school they attend, they will attempt o stay in school longer or go to a school 
designed for students whose ability is higher than theirs, so that they can be 
grouped with the more able students. This, of course, leads to a response from 
the more able. It turns out that, as a consequence, there may not exist an 
equilibrium for the purely private school system, but when it does exist, it has 
some rather interesting properties. The contrast between the majority-voting- 
public, private and output maximizing school systems takes on some new aspects. 
The model whichweemployisessentiallythat of section 3.2(c). Individuals have 
identical wealth, W, but differ with respect o their ability. We first consider the 
private and public educational system with screening only performed by self- 
selection (e.g., no examinations). The model is developed for the special case of 
two ability groups only. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 then introduce screening by self- 
selection and examination. This, as will be seen, substantially complicates the 
analysis. 
5.1. Prioate schools: self-selection only 
As we mentioned earlier, we shall develop the analysis for the simplest case 
possible, where there are only two ability groups. As in section 3.2, the marginal 
productivity, p, is a function of ability and education, 
p = &n(E). 
The two ability groups we denote by Or and 02, with 
where 0 is the average ability level. In fig. 5 we have drawn the three ‘pro- 
ductivity curves’. The dotted line corresponding to 0 we refer to as the pooled 
productivity curve. If the individual’s ability were known, he would receive a 
wage equal to his marginal productivity, i.e., a point on the curves L?,m(E) or 
O,m(E) depending on his ability, 8, and education, E. If there were no informa- 
tion about any individual’s ability but all individuals had the same education 
level E, then the wage would be given by Bm(E), a point on the pooled productivity 
curve. 
368 J. E. Stiglift, Dentaml for education 
We define an equilibrium as a set of schools (education levels) such that no new 
school, at a different educational level, can be introduced which will attract 
students and ‘make a profit’ (i.e., charge more per student than its expenditure 
per student) when the graduates of the school are paid a wage equal to the mean 
marginal productivity. 
In the absence of any examinations and any consumption aspect of education, 
individuals would simply go to the school the net income of whose graduates 
was the highest. Thus, there would only be a single kind of school and it would 
be that level which maximize the net average per capita income, i.e., where the 




Fig. 5. Productivity curves. 
On the other hand, if education is a consumption good as well, and the con- 
sumption value is positively correlated with ability, then there cannot exist 
equilibrium with a single educational level. Such a point would yield incomes 
along the pooled production curve. By the assumption that the more able value 
education more highly, their indifference curves through any point are steeper 
than those of the less able. Clearly, an equilibrium educational system must be 
at a point on the pooled production function where the slope lies between those 
of the two groups of individuals (otherwise both could be made better off). 
Consider a point such as P in fig. 6. There then exists a point such as P’ which is 
preferred by the more able to the original point, but is not preferred by the less 
ab!e. Thus, they would select to go to the new private school, which would have 
separated out the more able from the less able by the process of self-selection. 
Hence, the original situation could not have been an equilibrium. 
There may exist a private school equilibrium in which there are two difierent 
schools. If the less able attend their own schools, they will clearly choose the 
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educational level which maximizes their own utility, i.e., where their indifference 
curves are tangent to their own educational production function. But if the more 
able are to be separated from the less able, then the more able must choose a 
point on their own productivity curve, E, , which does not induce the less able 
to ‘mix’ with them. Hence, as fig. 7 makes clear, the more able must become over 
educated in order to screen themselves out from the less able. 
On the other hand, this may not be an equilibrium. For consider the more able 
individuals’ indifference curve through the point E, . If it intersects the pooled 
productivity curve, there exists a pooled school which is preferred by both 
groups to two separate schools. But clearly, the pooled (comprehensive) school 
cannot be an equilibrium. 
Net income 
E; E 
Fig. 6. No ‘pooling’ equilibrium. 
The likelihood of the existence of a point on the pooled productivity curve 
which is preferred to the two separate schools by both groups [i.e., the likeli- 
hood of the non-existence of an equilibrium private (competitive) school 
system] is greater (a) the closer the pooled productivity curve is to the pro- 
ductivity curve for the more able (i.e., the smaller the proportion of 8, in the 
population or the smaller the difference between 8, and f3,), and (b) the closer 
the indifference curves of the more able are to the indifference curves of the less 
able. (When the indifference curves are identical there exists an equilibrium with 
a single school, as we noted above.) 
The problems associated with existence of equilibrium in markets with 
imperfect information have been discussed extensively in Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1973). In particular, it should be noted that if we had considered the 
other polar case, with a continuum of abilities, then equilibrium would never 
have existed. 
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The concept of equilibrium we are using is .somewhat different from that 
employed by Spence (1973), who employs essentially a ‘partial’ equilibrium 
approach. He requires that individuals receive a wage which is on the productivity 
curve corresponding to those who receive the same amount of education. Thus, 
for instance, any point on the 8, productivity curve to the left of E, in con- 
junction with any point on the 8, productivity curve to the right of El would 
represent a ‘Spence equilibrium’. In effect, his analysis omits one of the crucial 
equilibrium conditions. 
Note that the private school system will not, in general, be income (or utility) 
maximizing: in the case where the indifference curves are identical, there is too 
much education given to the lower ability, too little to the upper ability. In the 
equilibrium with two separate schools, the lower ability individuals are at their 
Fig. 7 
utility maximizing position; but the upper ability individuals are spending more 
on education -in order to ‘screen’ themselves off from the lower ability in- 
dividuals - than is required for the maximization of their utility. In this sense, 
the lower ability individuals exert a dissipative externality on the more able 
individuals: the more able are worse off than they would have been in the absence 
of the less able, but the less able are no better off. 
5.2. Public schools; self-selection only 
In the previous subsection, we established that equilibrium in the private 
school system would be associated with the utility maximizing level of expendi- 
ture in the schools for individuals of lower ability, but excessive expenditures in 
the schools for individuals of higher ability. We shall now see that equilibrium in 
the public (or mixed public-private) school system is likely to entail larger 
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expenditures on education in the schools for students of lower ability but less 
in schools of higher ability. 
To see this, in fig. 8, we have plotted with a solid line the net income of the 
lower group as a function of the education level if only the lower group attends 
public schools, and if both groups attend public schools with the dotted line. 
We have marked the point g, where net income of the lower group would have 
been maximized were they to pay for their own education, i.e., 
O,m’(B,) = r ; 
A 
the point 8, where net income of the lower ability is maximized, given that only 
the lower ability individuals go to public school, but taxation is raised uniformly 
from everyone, i.e.,, 
tI,m’(l?,) = Jr, 
Fig. 8 
where 1 is the proportion of the population in group 2; and the point I& which 
maximizes average income when all go to’the same school, i.e., 
i9m’(l$) = r. 
Clearly 
& > &, 
and 
J!?a > 82, 
but 
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We have also marked the utility maximizing points: 
4 the level of education which maximizes 0,‘s utility in a private school 
& 
system; 
the level of education which maximizes 0,‘s utility in a public school 
system attended by only individuals of lower ability; 
&“, &” the level of education in a mixed public-private school system which 
maximizes utility of upper (lower) ability levels. 
Normally, 
Z, > E,, @>ET>B,. 
So long as private schools are allowed, the decision as to whether to ‘go to 
public or private schools is a decision taken by higher ability individuals, taking 
only their own interests into account, i.e., they compare their utility level were 
they to go to public school, with an educational level denoted by Em, with the 
level they attain if they go to private school. In equilibrium, then, if there is to 
be a private school, it will be chosen to 
max U’(Bm(E,) - rE, - rl.E”, El) (37) 
(0 
subject to 
U2(8.p(Em)--AEm, Em) 2 U2(8m(E,)-rE,-lE”r, E,), 
given E”, i e., it is the most preferred level of E, which will not, at the same time, 
attract the lower ability students. Let E”(E”) be the solution to (37) and let the 
value of U’ be denoted by U’“(Em); let U’(Em) denote the level of utility he 
would have attained had he gone to public school. Then, if there is to be an 
equilibrium with private schools, 
V*(P) > U$Y). 
There is a critical value of Em above which it no longer pays higher ability 
individuals to go to private schools. This critical level is depicted in fig. 9a, 
where the upper ability individual is indiflerent between going to private school 
and to public school. We denote this critical value of Em by ES*. Further increases 
in expenditure on public schools raise the utility which the individual could 
receive were he to go to public school and reduces his net income (after paying 
taxes) in private school, and so he unambiguously prefers to go to public school. 
As we have depicted fig. 9a, as the number of upper ability individuals who go 
to the public school increases, net income (at an expenditure level E”) in the public 
school would increase. This makes the public schools more attractive. In fig. 9b 
we have depicted the critical value cf Em, below which it no longer pays higher 
ability individuals to remain in the public school. We denote this critical level 
by Es. In the case depicted in fig. 9, ES* > i?, but if at-E’, the switching of higher 
ability individuals from private school lowers net income in the public school, 
thenl? > ES*. 
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Although the more able make their own decision about whether to go to 
private schools, their decision clearly depends critically on the level of education 






the majority, and in the subsequent analysis, we shall assume that the lower 
ability group is in the majority. 
We can then consider two alternatives : the lower ability group (the majority) 
makes its decisions myopically, i.e., failing to take into account the reactions of 
the more able group, or it makes its decisions with full knowledge of the total 
consequences. 
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Myopic decision making 
As in the earlier analysis of section 4, the preferences of the majority (the 
lower ability group) will not be single-peaked. For very low expenditure levels 
on public education, the more able clearly prefer going to private school; the 
utility of the less able clearly increases with successive increases in education. 
But at the critical level of expenditure in the public schools, which we denoted 
above by ES*, it no longer pays an individual of ability 8 1 to go to private school. 
As individuals of higher ability switch to the public schools, taxes rise and in- 
comes before taxes in the public school also rise (since a larger fraction of the 
‘graduates’ are higher ability, and all graduates are treated identically). The net 
income of the lower ability students will, at this level of education, change 
discreetly: the increase in taxes lowers their income, the increase in average 
ability of the graduates raises it. The net effect is indeterminate. 
Fig. lOa-f illustrates some of the various possibilities : 
(a) Preferences of lower ability are single-peaked with peak occuring at 
Em < ES*. In this case, the level of expenditure on education in the public 
schools is higher than it would have been in the corresponding private school 
for lower ability; on the other hand, expenditure on education in the upper 
ability school is normally smaller than it would have been in the pure private 
school system: the tax required to finance the public school has an income effect 
which normally would reduce the demand for education; and the higher level 
of expenditure on educ:a:ion for the lower ability individuals means that the 
required level of expenditure on education in the upper school to exclude the 
lower ability students is lowered. 
(b) Preferences of lower ability has a single peak, with the peak occuring at 
ES* : ES* > I?. With myopic voting behaviour, there is no ‘equilibrium’ but the 
expenditure oscillates. At E slightly below ES*, the lower ability individuals vote 
for increases in Es, to a level at which private schools are no longer viable; when 
there are no private schools, when the expenditure is above ,!?, they vote for 
reductions in expenditure. As expenditures get lower, eventually private schools 
become attractive once again at the point we have denoted by I?. Thus the 
expenditure oscillates between J? and Es*, never settling down. 
(c) Preferences are single peaked, with peak occurring at Es* < Em < I?. For 
expenditure levels between @ and ES*, the public schools would be mixed; some 
of the upper ability students would go to private school, some to public school. 
Although when all the upper ability individuals go to public school, net income 
of the lower ability is smaller than when none of them go, it may reach a peak 
when a fraction of the upper ability individuals go to the public school. This is 
the case depicted in fig. 10~. 
(d) Preferences are single-peaked, with peak occurring at E > ES*. Then the 
equilibrium is a pure public school system; with the equilibrium expenditure being 
the point on the ‘pooling curve’ which maximizes the utility of the lower ability 
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individuals. This will entail a higher level of expenditure than the lower ability 
would have purchased in the mixed public-private school system (and a fortiori 
higher than they would have purchased in a pure private school system) but 
lower than the expenditure level which the able would have purchased in a 
private school system. 
E“ + 
Fig. 10. (a) Equilibrium mixed public-private school system; (b) no equilibrium with myopic 
voting; (c) equilibrium with mixed public-private systems (level of expenditure determined to 
exclude 8,). 
(e) Preferences of lower ability have two peaks, one at an expenditure lower 
than ES*, and one at an expenditure greater than Es*. Then there are two ‘local’ 
equilibria, one with a pure public school system (a single school for everyone) 
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and one with a mixed public-private school system. 
(f) Preferences of lower ability have two peaks, one at an expenditure lower 
than Es and one at Es*. The two possible ‘equilibria’ have been described under 
(a) and (b). 
(g) Preferences of lower ability have two peaks, one at an expenditure greater 
than Es* and one at Es*. In this case, there is only one myopic equilibrium, that 
with a pure public school system. The reason for this is that at ES*, the lower 
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Fig. 10. (d)-(g). 
no longer find private school attractive, observe that increases in expenditure 
increases their income. But after voting for some expenditure level in excess of 
ES’::, the private sector ‘atrophies’; in the new, pure public school system, the 
optimal level of expenditure is at some level higher than Es*. 
Which situation we are in depends critically on whether, at Es, income of the 
lower ability individuals rises or falls as the individuals of higher ability ‘join’ 
the public school system. It is more likely to rise, the larger the difference in 
ability. 
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Non-myopic voting 
There are two important differences between myopic and non-myopic voting. 
First, the lower ability individuals know that if expenditures exceed max(ES*, 
g’“), private schools will not be viable, and if they fall below min(E’*, 83, a pure 
public school system will not be viable. Hence, in situation (b) above, they 
would set E” at a level slightly higher than 6’. Secondly, when there are ‘two 
peaks’, they can make sure that the expenditure level chosen is that at which their 
utility is actually highest, i.e., they decide, given the reactions of the higher ability 
individuals, whether, in effect, to have a pure public school system or a mixed 
public-private school system. 
Note that while in the pure private school system, the lower ability simply 
choose that level of expenditure on education which maximizes their utility, 
Income 





without regard to the higher ability individuals; in thiscase, the lower ability 
may choose a higher level of expenditure than they otherwise would have 
chosen - in order to attract the upper ability individuals into the public school 
system and to discourage a private school system - or they may choose a lower 
level of expenditure than they would otherwise have chosen - in order, in effect, 
to keep the upper ability students in private school and thus force them to pay 
‘twice’ for education. (Fig. 11 provides an example of a comparison between 
private and mixed public-private school systems.) 
5.3. Screening by examination 
So far, we have focused on screening through self-selection. Perhaps the most 
important part of educational screening is a result of the educational process 
itself; that is in the course of education a great deal of information about 
individuals’ characteristics is produced as a by-product. Indeed, one of the ways 
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in which the educational system increases productivity is to sort out individuals 
into their comparative advantages, and in doing so, it obtains a great deal of 
information about absolute advantages. 
More accurate screening means education yields a private return which differs 
from the social return; for in addition to the direct productivity effect of in- 
creased educational expenditure the individual is ‘separated out’ more accurately 
from individuals with whom he otherwise would have been grouped. If the 
individuals with whom he otherwise would have been grouped had a higher 
productivity than he, then this screening effect means the private return to 
screening will be negative; if the individuals with whom he would have been 
grouped had a lower productivity, then the private return will be positive. 
There may, of course, be a ‘social’ return from sorting individuals according 
to their ability. Within the educational system itself screening yields a return in 
enabling students of different ability levels to obtain the education appropriate 
to their ability level. The social returns from this sorting, however, are markedly 
different from the private returns. The social return in screening is from not 
‘wasting’ educational resources on the less able; the private return is not sharing 
ability rents with the less able. Private returns may be greater or less than social 
returns. It is clear, however, that in general in either a private or a public school 
system there is not likely to be an ‘efficient’ level of educational expenditure. 
To see more clearly the nature of the equilibrium, let us continue with our 
analysis of an economy with only two ability groups. The school system puts 
‘labels’ on all individuals passing through it; each individual is labelled either 
‘upper ability’ or ‘lower ability’. No labelling (screening) system is perfect, so 
some individuals are misclassified. But an individual receives an income equal 
to the mean marginal productivity of those with whom he is classified. 
Finally, we assume that higher levels of expenditure on education will, in 
general, be associated with more accurate screening. 
Prioate scltools 
The analysis proceeds much as in section 4.1 with two important modifications. 
Now, the income of individuals is a random variable, with a distribution depend- 
ing on their ability, the level of education, and the mix of individuals in their 
school. For simplicity, we shall consider the ‘certainty equivalent’ income, and 
in the diagram, it is this which now becomes the vertical axis. Secondly, this 
certainty equivalent income is different for individuals of the two ability groups 
(while in the earlier analysis, all individuals going to the same school received 
the same income). 
In fig. 12, we have drawn the ‘income’ curves for the upper ability individuals 
assuming that only able individuals go to the upper school (this curve is identical 
with that of earlier figures), and assuming that everyone goes to the same school. 
Similarly, we have drawn the lower ability income curves assuming that they go 
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to the lower ability school (again, the same as depicted in earlier figures) and 
assuming that everyone goes to the same school. The indifference curve of the 
lower ability individual tangent to his own income curve is also drawn. If some, 
but less than 100% of the lower ability individuals go to the lower school, then 
they must be on the same indifference curve. The corresponding income points 
of the higher ability individuals are given by the dotted line, in fig. 12, and the 
utility maximizing level of expenditure in the private schools is given by the 
tangency of the dotted line with the upper ability individual’s indifference curve. 
In this case, the equilibrium expenditure on education in the ‘upper school’ is 
less than in the private school system with no screening-by-examination. 
IncOme 0, m(E)-E 
Fig. 12 
Public schools 
The major alterations in our analysis of the equilibrium in the public school 
and mixed public-private school systems are: (a) Es*, the maximum value of 
expenditure on public schools at which private schools are still viable, is lowered; 
since even the public schools are partially differentiating between the more and 
the less able, the expected utility of the more able in going to public school is 
increased. (b) The level of expenditure in the public schools, when both groups 
go to public school, when it is not equal to ES*, is reduced, for two reasons - (i) 
the expected real return to education (from.‘skill acquisition’) is lower for the 
lower ability than it is for the population as a whole, (ii) the increased expendi- 
ture on education may increase the differentiation between the more able and 
the less able, and thus lower the expected income of the less able.” 
Thus, the effect of screening-by-examination is to lower expenditure in public 
schools, and in the mixed public-private school system, to lower it in the private 
loThis factor need not be very important; the less able may design a school system with only 
limited screening, and, more important, the accuracy of screening need not increase with expen- 
ditures. 
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school as well. The lower ability individuals need not necessarily be worse off 
as a result of the screening-by-examination. If the equilibrium level of expendi- 
ture was at a high level in order to induce the more able to stay in the public 
school, the gains from lowering the expenditure on education must be set against 
the losses from the ‘discrimination’ between upper and lower ability groups. 
5.4. Analysis with three groups 
The presence of more than two ability groups obviously complicates the 
analysis. At the extreme, as we noted earlier, with a continuum of ability groups, 
there will not, in general, exist a private school equilibrium with only self- 
selection [Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973)]. The introduction of a third group, 
does, however, raise some new and interesting aspects of the analysis, while 
keeping it analytically tractable. 
We assume that the middle group is in the majority, and that the lowest ability 
would, if left on its own, purchase zero education. 
Private school system 
The upper group chooses its level of education dependent on the level of 
expenditure of the middle group. Let E, and EM be the two levels of expenditure 
on education. At very low levels of EM, the lower ability individuals attend the 
middle school; they risk their ‘tuition’ for the chance of being misclassified as a 
‘middle ability individual’. At these low levels of EM - and correspondingly low 
levels of utility of the middle class - the critical level of expenditure in the upper 
school which discourages the middle ability from attending their schools is 
quite high. Then, as EM increases, there is reached a critical value, Eg*, at which 
it no longer is attractive for all the lower ability individuals to go to the middle 
school. As fewer of the lower ability go to the middle school, it becomes all the 
more attractive for the remainder, since if they do get misclassified, they receive 
a higher income. Finally, at E,, “SL it is no longer attractive for any of the lower 
ability individuals to go to the middle school. 
Consider, at the other extreme, very high levels of expenditure in the middle 
school. There exists sufficiently high expenditure levels (I$*) that it does not pay 
the upper ability individuals to run their own schools. As the level of expenditure 
EhI is reduced, eventually a level is reached where it pays a few of the upper 
ability individuals to found their own school. But as upper ability individuals 
leave the middle school, the utility level of the middle individuals is lowered, and 
the required expenditure to ‘separate’ out the two schools increases. At the same 
time, the middle school becomes less attractive to the upper group. There are 
thus two possibilities: there is a discrete change in the expected income of the 
middle group; we switch discontinuously between a ‘one and a two’ type school 
system; or there exists an interval, within which the middle school is attended by 
some (but not all) of the upper ability individuals. 
J. E. Stiglitz, Demand for education 381 
Thus expected utility of the middle class - taking into account the reaction of 
the upper and lower classes - may have several peaks: there may be a low level 
peak, when the middle school is also attended by individuals of lower ability; 
since a large fraction of educational expenditures are then unproductive, the 
‘optimal level of expenditure’ in the school is very low; there may exist another 
peak in the interval during which only the middle ability attend the middle 
school, or the peak may be at the boundaries, Eg* or EC*. Finally, there may 
be a high level peak when the school is attended by both the upper and middle 
ability individuals (fig. 13). 
As in our earlier discussion, a competitive equilibrium may not exist; when it 
does, the nature of the equilibrium depends to a large extent on the degree of 
myopia concerning the reactions of the one group to any action of the other 









of expenditure of the other group as given. In our earlier discussion, we traced 
out the curve giving E,’ as a function of EM. It is obviously in the interests of 
the middle group to be grouped with the upper group, so long as the upper 
group’s expenditure is not too high. The only way to ensure this is to set EM = 
E,, for En < EH < I?, . For values of E, greater than the critical value, E,, 
the middle school chooses whatever level ofexpenditure maximizes its own utility. 
For values of E, below the critical value En, ‘there is a value of EM which will 
attract all the upper group individuals. The resulting reaction curves are depicted 
in fig. 14. 
As depicted, there is an indeterminacy in equilibrium, with a single private 
school attended only by upper and middle students (but not by lower ability 
students). Other configurations are easily characterized. 
More generally, if some individuals do not have perfect knowledge of their 
abilities, or if they differ in their attitudes towards risk, then the expected income 
F 
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of the middle group will be a continuous function of EM, the reaction functions 
may take on more complicated shapes, and multiple equilibria for the two school 
systems may arise. Assume that the majority within each group are risk neutral 
and are certain of their abilities. Each school is designed to maximize the expected 
net incomes of the respective group for which it is designed. Expected net income 
of a person going to the upper school who is of the higher ability is a function of 
the level of expenditure in both schools, 
WHH = W-(E,, EM). 
Similarly 
WMM = WMM(EH, EM). 
Fig. 14 
The higher school chooses EH given EM to maximize W”” and similarly for the 
school designed for the middle group. The reaction functions may take on a 
variety of forms. Fig. 15 illustrates a case where they may intersect several times. 
There is thus a low expenditure level equilibrium and a high expenditure level 
equilibrium: in the latter, the more able spend a great deal on education to 
separate themselves off from the less able, while the less able spend a great deal 
to attract more of the more able. One of the equilibria may be Pareto Inferior. 
Public and mixed public-private SCJ~OOJS 
The only modification to our earlier analysis of public and mixed public- 
private schools arises from the fact that the lower group cannot be excluded from 
the public schools; since the lower group does not pay tuition, they will always 
face no risk in attempting to pass the ‘screening system’. If the middle group 
wishes to separate itself off from the lower group, it either has to opt for a 
private school system or have sufficient screening-by-examination. If additional 
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expenditure on education is associated with more accurate screening, then the 
middle group will demand more education than they would have in the absence 
of the ‘screening effect’. (At the same time, of course, they wish to avoid being 
‘screened off’ from the higher ability, i.e., they seek screening systems which 
separate the lower ability from the middle and upper, but do not separate the 
middle from the upper.) 
5.5. Welfare economics of the private school system 
When the equilibrium consists of two separate schools, there is a tendency for 
excessive expenditure (relative to the income or utility maximizing level) in both 
schools. Consider the three effects of an increase in educational expenditure in 
EM 
Fig. 15 
the upper school. First, there is the direct productivity effect. Since the upper 
school focuses its attention on those who will ‘succeed’ it spends more on this 
account than a government-run school. Secondly, there is the direct screening 
effect, which is simply redistributive in character, and again leads to ‘too much’ 
spending on education. Thirdly, there is the self-selection effect. By increasing 
educational expenditure, and the quality of screening, the upper school dis- 
courages those of lower ability from attempting to go to the upper school. 
There is, as we noted earlier, some social return to this, since the amount of 
education which is optimal for the less able is less than that which is optimal for 
the more able. The private return, however, is derived not from the increased 
‘efficiency’ of the educational system, but from the ability of the more able to 
capture more of their ‘ability rents’. The private return to self-selection may be 
more or less than the social return. 
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A similar analysis applies to the lower (middle) school. It is obviously not in 
the interests of those of lower ability to have extensive screening (which separates 
them from the more able). Although the social return to self-selection is positive, 
the private return to those of lower or middle ability may be negative. By 
increasing the level of educational expenditures they are, however, able to attract 
those of higher ability who are less sure of their abilities and more risk averse. 
This again leads to some presumption of excess spending even in the lower 
(middle) school. When it is publicly financed, there is a further incentive for 
excess spending, since now the costs for the lower school are borne by the 
population as a whole. On the other hand, the increased tax burden if the upper 
ability individuals switch from private to public schools may lead to a lower 
level of expenditure. 
Stiglitz (forthcoming) has investigated in some detail the publicly supported 
comprehensive school, in the case of a continuous distribution of abilities. It was 
shown that, for fairly accurate grading systems, the majority voting equilibrium 
entails both a higher level of educational expenditure and a larger coefficient of 
variation in incomes than would be the case if net national product were maxi- 
mized, provided the median of the distribution is greater than the mode, as in 
the lognormal distribution. 
More generally, what is clear is that neither the private nor the public 
majority voting school systems does as well as a ‘benevolent despot’ might have 
done. Neither has any clear optimality properties; whether one is preferable to 
another depends not only on political and value judgements but even on narrow 
efficiency grounds, the comparison requires detailed knowledge of production 
functions, ability distributions, the structure of the educational system and how 
screening and skill acquisition are related, etc. 
6. Concluding comments 
This paper has attempted to trace out the determination of the equilibrium 
level of education in private, mixed public-private school systems, and public 
school systems, viewing education separately as a public consumption good, a 
private capita1 good, a private consumption good and a source of information 
about individual’s abilities. In each case, we observed that the equilibrium level 
was not likely to be at the ‘efficient’ level; in some cases as when education is 
viewed as a pure public good there was some presumption for the equilibrium 
to be an undersupply. In other cases there was some presumption for excessive 
expenditures on education. The relative importance of these various considera- 
tions is, I am sure, a subject on which we can have much debate. 
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